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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
*

BOBBIE C. DICKINSON,
*

Plaintiff - Appellant,

Case No. 870334-CA
*

vs.
*

SHERRIL COTTRELL DICKINSON,
nka SHERRIL HENRIE,

Category No. 15
*

Defendant - Respondent

*

JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to entertain this appeal
pursuant to UCA §78-2a-3 (2 ) (g) .
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Following a decree of divorce between the parties
hereto, Plaintiff petitioned the District Court to modify the
decree of divorce so as to relieve him from the obligation to
satisfy a second real estate mortgage owing against the
residence of the parties which had beeii awarded in full to
Defendant.

The District Court denied the petition, finding no

substantial change in material circumstances.

Plaintiff appeals

the order denying his petition.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The broad issue which is presented for review is
whether the District Court erred in failing to find a sufficient
change of circumstances so as to justify a modification of the
decree of divorce.

Central to that general issue, Plaintiff
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asserts that (a) the Court erred in failing to find that his
annual income had decreased substantially, and (b) in failing
to find that Defendants income had increased due to her
receipt of rental income from the home which she was awarded by
the decree of divorce.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES
This appeal does not call for any review or analysis
of constitutional provisions, ordinances or other rules.
However, the provisions of UCA §30-3-5, do provide broad
statutory guidance.

Subsection (3) of that statute reads as

followings:
The Court has continuing jurisdiction to
make subsequent changes or new orders for
the support and maintenance of the parties,
the custody of the children and their
support, maintenance, health, and dental
care, or the distribution of the property as
is reasonable and necessary.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal presents issues which arose between the
parties after a decree of divorce in the District Court.

The

case was tried on October 30, 1985 and a decree followed.
During a number of post-decree hearings, the parties litigated
issues of (a) child custody, (b) termination of alimony, (c)
claims for post-decree attorneyTs fees, and (d) whether
Plaintiff should be relieved from the obligation to pay a
second real estate mortgage owing to lions First National Bank
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which encumbered the home property that was awarded to
Defendant in the original decree.

Heatings were conducted by

the Court on September 10, 1986, May 13, 1987, and May 27, 1987,
to accomplish the foregoing.

The only issue which survives

those prolonged proceedings is that sufrounding Plaintifffs
obligation to satisfy the real estate Mortgage to Zions First
National Bank.

The District Court denied relief to the

Plaintiff in that regard, finding an insufficient change in the
circumstances of the parties.

Plaintiff appeals that decision,

with no cross appeal being pursued by Defendant.
IDENTIFICATION OF TRANSCRIPTS
Four transcripts are included with the record on
appeal.

One transcript reports the original trial proceeding,

and the other three transcripts report the three post-trial
evidentuary hearings.

To assist the Court, the trial

transcript will be referred to as the usual

M

TR" designation,

and the other transcripts will be referred to by
by the date of the hearing.

ff M

T

followed

For example, the transcript which

reports the May 27, 1987 hearing will tye designated as "T
27May87 M .
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The decree of divorce between these parties addressed
issues of (a) division of personal property, (b) award of
residence, and (c) two real estate mortgages owing against the
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residence.

Certain firewood was divided evenly between the

parties without any designation of value (Record 33). The
balance of the personal property was divided between the
parties pursuant to a proposed division submitted by Plaintiff
(Record 32 and 33). Other than the firewood, the various
values of the personal property was set forth in Exhibits 2 and
5 which were received by the Court (TR 4).

Plaintiff offered

testimony in confirmation of those values (TR 26 and 27). The
value of the home was placed at $55,000.00 (Exhibit 2 ) , and
that value was acknowledged by Defendant (T 44 13May87).
values were never disputed.

Those

Defendant was ordered to assume

the first real estate mortgage owing against the residence to
Farmers Home Administration in the approximate sum of
$18,500.00 (Record 32), and Plaintiff as ordered to assume the
second real estate mortgage owing on the home to Zions First
National Bank in the approximate sum of $18,000.00 (Record
33).

Defendant was awarded the home itself, Plaintiff not

receiving any interest therein (Record 32).
The decree of divorce then results in a property
division as follows:
To The Plaintiff
Personal property

$4,850.00

TOTAL . . . . . .

$4,850.00

To The Defendant
Personal Property
Residence
TOTAL

$ 8,750.00
55,000.00
$63,750.00
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Defendant's obligation to assume the mortgage to
Farmers Home Administration would reduce the value of her
property in the amount of the mortgage, $18,500.00, such that
the value of the property received by her would then be
$45,250.00.

Plaintiff's obligation to pay the second mortgage

to Zions First National Bank would place the value of the
property awarded to him at the negative figure of -$13,150.00.
The Court found Plaintiff's earnings at $25,000.00 per year,
and the earnings of Defendant at $2,100.00 per year (Record 27).
Plaintiff's child support obligation wgs fixed at $300.00 per
month for two of the children, and his alimony obligation to
Defendant was set at $300.00 per month for a period of twentyfour months (Record 27).
After the Dickinsons had divorced, Wallace K. Henrie
and Gloria Henrie obtained a divorce from one another, and Mr.
Dickinson married the prior Mrs. Henrie (Gloria), and Mr.
Henrie married the prior Mrs. Dickinson (Sherril) (T 10 and 11
27May87).
Mr. Henrie was a seven year employee of Zions First
National Bank (TR 11 and 12 27May87), and had gross income for
the year of 1986 of $28,438.29 (TR 12 and 13 27May87).
Defendant's income for 1986 was a gross of $2,728.62 from wages
(TR 13 27May87), but that income did not reflect child support
income nor income from rents on the home which she was awarded
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in the divorce.

Following Defendants marriage to Mr. Henrie,

she moved into his home in Richfield, and placed tenants in the
Glenwood home, the residence which she was awarded in the
Dickinson divorce (T 29 27May87).

Those tenants commenced

occupancy in June of 1986 and made monthly rental payments of
$260.00 each under a two year contract (T 30 27May87).
Defendant continued to pay the monthly installment on the
mortgage to Farmers Home Administration of $162.00 (T 31
27May87).
Plaintiff's present wife (the prior Mrs. Henrie) was
employed at the time of the May 27, 1987 hearing with net
monthly earnings of $850.00 (T 39 27May87).

Plaintiff's gross

income for 1986 was $17,333.92 (T 18 27May87), and he had no
other sources of income (T 19 27May87).

Plaintiff's income of

$25,000.00 per year which was found by the Court at the time of
the decree had resulted in bonuses or commissions which he had
earned in addition to his ordinary wage (T 17 and 18 27May87).
On March 18, 1987, Michael Henrie, who resided in the
Dickinson household, turned eighteen years of age which
terminated Mr. Henrie's support obligation of $165.00 per month
to the then present Mrs. Dickinson (T 46 13May87).

Michael was

a senior in high school at that time (T 47 13May87).

Mr.

Dickinson continued to support Michael as a member of his household (T 58 13May87).
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By the time of the May, 1987 hearing, the Dickinsons
had overspent their income for the previous year by
approximately $3,000.00 (T 48 13May87)(See details in Exhibit 8
received at the May 13, 1987 hearing).

That deficit was

financed by the Dickinsons by use of a credit card (T 54
13May87).
Plaintiff then argued the following changes in
circumstances to support his petition (JRecord 164 - 167):
a.

Defendant was remarried and was supported by

her present husband who had gainful employment at Zions First
National Bank with annual earnings in excess of $28,000.00.
b.

Defendant personally had an income increase

from $2,100.00 as found by the Court atl the time of the decree
to the sum of $2,728.62 for the calendar year of 1986.
c.

Defendant had let the Glenwood home to

tenants at a monthly rental of $260.00, for an annual income
increase of $3,120.00.
d.

Plaintiff's income had decreased from

$25,000.00 in 1985 to $17,333.92 in 1986.
e.

Child support of $165.00 per month to the

Dickinson household for Michael Henrie had terminated, although
Plaintiff continued to have the actual support obligation for
that child who was at the time a senior in high school.

- 8 -

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Court erred in finding that Plaintiff!s income had
not decreased.

Plaintiff had income of $25,000.00 for the year

of 1985, but because of the absence of bonuses and commissions
during 1986, his income decreased to $17,333.92, a difference
of approximately $8,000.00.

Plaintiff testified as to that

amount of income, and offered tax returns and other records in
verification.

Defendant offered nothing to controvert that

evidence and the finding of the Court that Plaintifffs income
had not decreased was totally lacking in any evidentuary basis.
Defendant's income had increased because of her rental
of the Glenwood home, a positive cash flow of $3,120.00 per
year, but the Court erred in not giving that increase in income
the weight and significance to which it was entitled.

The

Court viewed the existence of maintenance, insurance and
property taxes as offsetting that income, but failed to realize
that those expenses existed before the placing of tenants in the
home.
The remarriage of Defendant, the decrease in
Plaintiff's income, the increase in Defendant's income, and
Plaintiff's continued support of Michael Henrie after he turned
eighteen years of age, combined to show significant changes in
the circumstances of the parties as to warrant the relief
requested by Plaintiff, and the Court committed error in

- 9 -

faiilng to find a material change of circumstances.
ARGUMENT

POINT I -- THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN
FAILING TO FIND THAT PLAINTIFF'S INCOME
HAD DECREASED BY $8,000,00
At the time of the divorce trial the Plaintiff had
wage income combined with bonus and commission income which
totalled approximately $25,000.00, and the trial Court
correctly found that to be his annual Earnings.

Plaintiff

testified that the year in question, 1985, was a good year for
his employment and that he had a numbeir of commission jobs.
However, the year of 1986 had not prodi^ced any commission jobs,
and he was relegated to his fixed wage which produced a gross
of $17,333.92.

That figure was verified by Plaintiff's 1986

W-2 tax statement.

Defendant did not 0ffer any evidence to

controvert the testimony and documents which Plaintiff had
offered to show his 1986 income.

Defendant did acknowledge

that she could have subpoenaed Plaintiff's employment records,
his bank records, take his deposition, or produce his tax
records, but that she had not done so (T 36 and 37 27May87).
In the face of foregoing, the trial Court refused to
find that Plaintiff's income had decreased (T 55 27May87).

The

court justified that conclusion by stating that Plaintiff had
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income in 1985 which was in addition to his W-2 statement
income, without any explanation as to how that would impact
income for 1986.

In other words, the trial Court relied upon

evidence received at the time of the divorce trial (October 30,
1985) and totally ignored the absence of any evidence to
discredit the testimony and documentary evidence which Plaintiff
offered to support his claim at the May, 1987 hearings.

The

f!

clearly erroneous" standard is met when there is nothing in

the evidence to support the finding in question.
POINT II -- THE COURT, ERRED IN ITS FAILURE TO
FIND THAT DEFENDANT'S INCOME HAD INCREASED BY
$3,120.00 PER YEAR AS A RESULT OF RENTALS
RECEIVED FROM THE GLENWOOD HOME
At the time of the divorce of the parties the Defendant
was residing in the Glenwood home.
in full.

She was awarded that asset

She then married Mr. Henrie, moved to his home in

Richfield, and placed tenants in possession of the Glenwood
home at a rental of $260.00 per month.

The lease began in June

of 1986, and would run for a period of two years.

Defendant

had the obligation to pay insurance and taxes for the Glenwood
home, and would have had ordinary maintenance expenses.

Those

items exist independent of a letting of the home to tenants.
Defendant had those obligations when she resided in the home,
and they continued after she ceased to reside at that residence.
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The cash flow result is obvious.
by the sum of $3,120.00.

Her annual income increased

Despite that obvious cash flow change

for the better, the Court found that Defendant was not receiving
any Appreciable disposable cash." (Record 171)
POINT III -- THE COURT ERRED ^N FAILING TO FIND
A MATERIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUM$TANCES SO AS TO
JUSTIFY A MODIFICATION C|F THE DECREE
Plaintiff's income from 1985 tio 1986 had decreased by
$7,667.00, primarily because he was unable to secure any
commission or bonus projects.

Defendant's income had increased

$3,120.00 as a result of rentals received by her from the
Glenwood home.

In addition, her wage had increased from

$2,100.00 in 1985 to $2,728.00 in 1986, the difference being
$628.00.

Defendant had remarried with |her present husband

earning $28,000.00 per year.

Plaintiff had remarried and his

current spouse was earning approximately $12,000.00 gross per
year.

Michael Henrie who was supported by the Dickinson

household turned eighteen on March 18, 1987, resulting in a
monthly decrease of income to the Dickihson household of
$165.00.

Furthermore, the mortgage debt owing to Zions First

National Bank had been refinanced so as to reduce the monthly
installments from $399.00 per month to $218.00 per month, the
latter figure being less the rental income which Defendant was
realizing from her tenants.
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UCA §30-3-5 grants continuing jurisdiction for
subsequent changes with reference to distribution of property,
or with reference to support orders, among other matters.
Changes in relative incomes will justify the termination of
alimony, Haslam v. Haslam, Utah 657 P.2d 757 (1982).

Even in

the face of a stipulated waiver of alimony, a change in circumstances will justify the modification of a decree so as to
impose upon one party the obligation to pay alimony to the
other, Kinsman v. Kinsman, Utah 73 UAR 110 (January 12, 1988).
A stipulated property settlement is likewise subject to
modification, but would require compelling reasons to do so,
Land v. Land, Utah 605 P.2d 1248 (1980).

Although greater

restraint is imposed in modifying a property distribution when
compared with changes in continuing child and spousal support
orders, divorce Court directives for one party to assume and
satisfy a particular debt and hold the other party harmless are
often times viewed as in the nature of spousal support versus
property settlement and distribution, Holt v. Holt, Utah 672
P.2d 738 (1983); Beckmann v. Beckmann, Utah 685 P.2d 1045
(1984); Erickson v. Verardall, Utah 437 P.2d 210 (1968).

In

the instant matter, the burden to satisfy the mortgage to Zions
First National Bank, or relief from that burden, would directly
bear upon the income and expenses of the parties, and
consequently their support.

The real test should turn upon
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income resources when compared with income needs.

The whole

picture is either nmoney in" or "money out" and a labeling of
cash flow as support or property does not automatically solve
the difficult questions which are presented by cases of this
nature.

Thus, Plaintiff contends that the mortgage obligation

should be treated in the context of spdusal support and
adjudicated by a less rigorous standard than would apply to a
true property division situation.
Even if we are to view the dedreed obligation for
Plaintiff to assume and satisfy the Zions First National Bank
mortgage as strictly a property settlement, the facts of the
instant matter justify and warrant a finding that there have
been substantial changes in the circumstances of the parties.
Facts of less magnitude have been foundl to be ample, Teece v.
Teece, Utah 715 P.2d 106 (1986).

In a case of near parallel

facts to the instant matter the Utah Supreme Court observed
that the moving party had presented a prima facie case of
changed circumstances, Chandler v. West, Utah 610 P.2d 1299
(1980).

In Chandler, the parties had divorced pursuant to a

written stipulation which provided for an award of the parties
home to the Plaintiff (wife).

The home was valued at

$46,000.00, and the Defendant (husband) was ordered to make all
mortgage payments on the premises.
was less than $14,000.00.

The mortgage indebtedness

The husband in Chandler was also
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ordered to pay alimony of $300.00 per month.
dated February 9, 1977.

The decree was

In July of that year the wife sold the

home for $60,000.00 and remarried within weeks of the sale of
the home.

The husband then terminated mortgage payments and

order to show cause proceedings then litigated the issue.

The

husband claimed that the remarriage of the wife and her sale of
the home constituted a material change of circumstances so as
to justify a modification of the decree to relieve him from the
obligation to retire the mortgage.

The District Court viewed

the obligation on the part of husband to pay the mortgage part
of the property settlement between the parties and ordered
husband to continue making payments.

On appeal the Utah

Supreme Court observed that property settlements nare entitled
to a greater sanctity than alimony and support payments" but
stated that they are not sacrosanct nor beyond the equitable
power of the Court to modify.

The court in Chandler also

correctly observed that the order to pay the mortgage
obligation was not a typical property distribution matter,
viewing it in a class by itself.

At page 1300 of the Chandler

opinion, the Court stated:
Clearly it was within the power of the trial
Court to modify or eliminate the obligation to
make those payments if the obviously changed
circumstances under traditional equity
standards so require.
The Court then remanded the case because of the
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absence of needed findings of fact, but commented that husband
had presented "a prima facie case of changed circumstances
which basically raises a serious questions as to fairness and
equity of continuing the financial obligations of one party...?f
In the case at bar, the unfairtness of the situation is
crystalized when the original decree i$ used as a starting
point.

Defendant came out of the marrilage with assets having a

total value of $63,750.00, subject to a| mortgage obligation of
$18,500.00.

Plaintiff came out of the Imarriage with assets

totalling $4,850.00, and a mortgage obligation of $18,000.00.
In the face of that great disparity, Pl|aintifffs income has
decreased substantially, whereas Defendant has had some
increase to her income.

Furthermore, Defendant's rental income

from the home is ample to meet the continuing mortgage payments,
whereas Plaintiff is unable to meet his continuing monthly
expenses based upon his reduced income.

Even when the income

of his current wife is brought into the picture.
A final comment is needed regatding the continued
support by Plaintiff of Michael Henrie, the eighteen year old
teenager, who resides in his home.
that fact.

It is proper to consider

Obligations for a n new family" or a stepchild are

relevant in resolving issues of the type presented by this
appeal, Openshaw v. Openshaw, Utah 639 FT • 2d 177 (1981).
Michael Henrie had continuing support n^eds, and the reaching
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of his eighteenth birthday in March of 1987 did not alter those
needs.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff made a prima facie showing of a substantial
change in the circumstances of the parties, and the court erred
in failing to so find.

The Court should reinstate Plaintifffs

petition and remand the matter to the District Court for the
purpose of considering appropriate modifications to the decree.
DATED this 1st day of April, 1988.
LABRUM & TAYLOR
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KAY L.
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McIFF

OLSEN, McIFF & CHAMBERLAIN
Attorneys for Defendant
151 North Main Street
P. 0. Box 605
Richfield, Utah
84701
Telephone: 801 896-5441
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT} GF SEVIER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BOBBIE C. DICKINSON,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
IN RE PETITION TO MODIFY

vs.
SHERRIL COTTRELL DICKINSON,
nka SHERRIL HENRIE,
Civil Nb. 9602
Defendant.

THIS MATTER having come before the Court on the 27th
day of May, 1987, on the Plaintiff's petition for modification,
and the Court having heard the evidence adduced, and counsel
having stipulated that the Court could consider evidence previously introduced herein, and particularly evidence introduced at
a hearing held on May 13, 1987, and having heard the arguments of
counsel and being fully advised in the premises, now enters the
following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff's obligation to fpay a certain debt at

Zions First National Bank secured by a second mortgage on a home

2
in Glenwood, Utah, awarded to Defendant was part and parcel of
the* ^overall -property - settlement, which the Court decreed at the
time of granting

the divorce herein, and was not by way of

support payment to Defendant.
2.

At

the

time

of

entry

of

the

original

decree

herein, Plaintiff was ordered to pay to Defendant the sum of
$300.00 per month child support for two children, the sum of
$3 00.00 per month alimony, together with the payment required to
retire the debt at Zions First National B^nk.
3.

That by virtue of Defendant's remarriage, Plain-

tiff's alimony obligation of $300.00 per nonth has been terminated.
4.

That

Defendant

renegotiated

the

debt

at

Zions

Bank, which has inured to the benefit of Plaintiff, and his
monthly obligation has been reduced from $399.00 per month to
some $218.00 per month.
5.

That Defendant has remarried, and is now supported

by her present husband, who has a gross annual earning capacity
of some $28,438.00.
6.

That Plaintiff has remarried, and his present wife

has a gross annual earning capacity of $12,000.00.
7.

That Plaintiff's reportable income, as evidenced

by withholding statements supplied by hi$ employer, has at all
material

times

been

approximately

$17,000.00.

The

evidence

initially submitted to this Court by Plaintiff at the time of the
original divorce hearing indicated an estimated 1985 income of

3
$16,894.88.

Plaintiff's reportable income for the year 1986 was

$17,333. .92.
8.

At

the

time

of

the

original

divorce

hearing,

Plaintiff admitted that he had received cash payments from his
employer

beyond

what

was

reflected

in

the

exhibits

he

had

introduced, and based thereon the Court found that Defendant had
a

gross

earning

capacity

of

$25,000.00

annually.

Plaintiff

continues to work for the same employer, and the Court has not
been

convinced

that

there

has been

any

substantial

change

in

Plaintiff's earning capacity.
9.

During

the year

1986, Plaintiff

and his present

wife had net disposable income of some $34,539.00.
10.

That since entry of the decree herein, Defendant's

income has increased in a modest amount from $2,100.00 to some
$2,728.00.
11.
decree

That

subsequent

to

the

of divorce, Plaintiff married

entry

of

one Gloria

the

original

Henrie, whose

former husband thereafter married the Defendant herein, resulting
in Plaintiff paying child support to Defendant while at the same
time

Plaintiff's

present

wife

received

child

support

from

Defendant's present husband.
12.
received

child

That until April of 1987, Plaintiff's present wife
support

from her former husband

of $165.00 per

month for each of three children for a totial of $495.00.

At the

same time, Plaintiff paid to his former wife the sum of $150.00
per month per child for two children for a total of $300.00.

In

4
April of this year, Plaintifffs wifefs oldest child attained
majority, and, accordingly, she now receives payment for two
children at the rate of $165.00 each, for a total of $330.00.

At

the same time, Plaintiff continues to pay out for two children
the sum of $300.00.
13.

At the time of the entry ct>f the original divorce

decree, Defendant occupied the home awarded to her and had the
use and benefit thereof.
home

and

receives

Upon her remarrilage, she has rented the

therefrom

the

sum

<£>f $262.00

per -month.

However, she remains obliged to satisfy the first mortgage and to
pay taxes, insurance and upkeep, the coitnbined monthly cost of
which

approximates

the

rental

payment

received,

so

that

it

provides no appreciable disposable cash.
14.

Each party should bear his/her own costs.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff has failed to prove a sufficient material
change of

circumstances

to warrant

thi?

Court upsetting

the

property settlement originally decreed.

AFFIDAVIT OF MAILINq
I hereby* certify that a full, true and correct copy of
the above and foregoing FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN RE PETITION
TO MODIFY was placed in the United States mail at Richfield,

Utah, with
r^U^y

first-class postage

thereon

fully

prepaid

day of June, 1987, addressed as follows:
Mr. Marcus Ttaylor
P. 0. Box 724
Richfield, qtah
84701

mdi

fe/ffW//.

on the

KAY L. McIFF
OLSEN, McIFF & CHAMBERLAIN
Attorneys for Defendant
151 North Main Street
P. 0. Box 605
Richfield, Utah
84701
Telephone: 801 896-5441
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BOBBIE C. DICKINSON,
ORDER DENYING PETITION
TO MODIFY DECREE

Plaintiff,
vs.
SHERRIL COTTRELL DICKINSON,
nka SHERRIL HENRIE,

Civil N<^. 9602
Defendant.

THIS

MATTER

having

come

before

the

Court

on

the

petition of the Plaintiff to modify the deqree of divorce herein,
and the matter having come before the CoUrt for hearing on May
27, 1987, and the court having heard the Evidence and arguments,
and having entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and
being fully advised in the premises, orders as follows,to-wit:
Plaintiffs petition

to modify

the decree

is hereby

denied, and it shall remain in force and effect as originally
entered.
DATED this

/

day of Ju^fe^
jMy, 1987.

d
$

:\

2
DICKINSON VS. DICKINSON
CIVIL NO. 9602
ORDER DENYING PETITION TO
MODIFY DECREE (CONT.)

AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of
the above and foregoing ORDER DENYING PETITION TO MODIFY DECREE
was placed in the United States mail at, Richfield, Utah, with
first-class postage thereon fully prepaid^ on the rP-t^f day of
June, 1987, addressed as follows:
Mr. Marcus Taylor
P. 0. Box 724
Richfield, Utah
84701

MARCUS TAYLOR (3203)
LABRUM § TAYLOR
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
108 NORTH MAIN STREET
P.O. BOX 724
RICHFIELD, UTAH 84701
(801)896-6484
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

BOBBIE C. DICKINSON,
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
SHERRIL COTTRELL DICKINSON,
nka SHERRIL HENRIE,
Defendant/Respondent.

Civil No. 9602
*

Bobbie C. Dickinson, the Plaintiff/Appellant named aboved, by and
through his counsel, Marcus Taylor, hereby gives notice of his appeal to the
Utah Court of Appeals from that certain Order Denying Petition to Modify
Decree made and entered by the Sixth Judicial District Court of Sevier County,
said order bearing date of July 1, 1987, and having been entered by the Clerk
of the Court on the date of July 7, 1987.
DATED this 31st day of July, 1987.
LABRUM § TAYLOR

MARCUS TAYLOR

Notice of Appeal
Dickinson vs. Dickinson
Civil No. 9602

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I herewith and hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF
APPEAL was placed in the United States mail at Richfield, Utah, with
first-class postage thereon fully prepaid, this j j / 4 ^ day of July, 1987,
addressed as follows:
Kay L. Mclff, Esq.
OLSEN, McIFF § CHAMBERLAIN
151 North Main
Richfield, Utah 84701

Secretary

ft

